INKOVEMA Podcast „Well through time“
#228 GddZ
Peace or freedom – or what is going on here?
In conversation with Dr Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk
- German historian and publicist
- born 1967 in Berlin (East)
- studied history at the HU-Berlin, doctorate at the University of Potsdam.
- 1995 to 1998 honorary expert member of the Enquete Commission of the German Bundestag "Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of German Unity".
- 1998-2000 research consultant at the Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship.
- Author of numerous publications, including "17 June 1953", "Die Übernahme. How East Germany became part of the Federal Republic", "Stasi konkret. Surveillance and Repression in the GDR", "Endgame. The Revolution of 1989 in the GDR", his magnum opus on the biography of Walter Ulbricht (2024/2025)
- 2024 "Freedom Shock. A different history of East Germany from 1989 to the present day".
There is no politics in a dictatorship; that is why they are not called politicians.
Dictatorships have functionaries because they work.
In dictatorships there is ideology, but no politics, no public negotiation of public issues.
Small series: socio-political conflict situations
Freedom is betrayed in freedom.
Contents
Chapter
0:24 Introduction to today's episode
1:43 The challenges of mediators
5:24 Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk and his perspective
7:40 The influence of dictatorship on politics
10:07 The 90s in a political context
13:18 Historical contexts and current developments
15:43 The digital revolution and its consequences
23:23 The Russian war of aggression on Ukraine
25:59 The conflict between aggressor and defender
33:18 The defence of Western liberalism
40:14 The threat of authoritarian tendencies
46:51 Commitment to freedom and democracy
53:19 The longing for simple harmony
57:00 Conclusion and outlook for the future
Summary of content
In this special episode, I have invited **historian Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk** to talk about current socio-political developments that are also relevant for mediators and conflict counsellors. We discuss how conflict management is changing, especially in light of the Russian attack on Ukraine and the increasing political upheaval in Germany, represented by the electoral success of the AfD and other populist movements.
Kowalczuk contributes his perspective as someone who grew up in the GDR and experienced conflicts with authoritarian systems. He describes his personal experiences that motivated him to become a historian and discusses the profound social changes that were triggered by the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The impact of these historical events on today's political climate becomes clear, and it becomes clear that an understanding of history is essential for understanding current conflicts.
A central topic of our discussion is the challenge that the digital revolution poses for political and social coexistence. Kowalczuk points out that the influence of social media and digital platforms has significantly changed communication behaviour and the perception of reality. These changes often lead to polarisation, which makes it difficult to engage in consensual dialogue. The longing for harmony and peace that many people feel can quickly turn into a dictatorship of the majority in an authoritarian context, where the needs of minorities are ignored.
We reflect on the role of mediators in this field of tension. Is it our job to restore harmony or should we focus on creating the conditions for genuine, legitimate dialogue? Kowalczuk argues that conflicts can only be resolved sustainably if we understand the underlying power structures and historical contexts. In doing so, it becomes clear that without freedom and the ability to negotiate within a democratic framework, no real conflict resolution is possible.
Finally, we draw the connection between these historical, social and digital dynamics and the practice of mediation. It becomes clear that reflecting on one's own position and engaging with history is not only important for historians, but also for mediators working in an increasingly complex and conflict-ridden world. This episode encourages us to reflect on the present and to critically scrutinise our own methods and approaches to dealing with conflicts.
Complete transcription
[0:00]Today's episode is special because not only have I invited an external perspective with the historian Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk, but we are also talking about topics that are not immediately and directly related to the professionally required competences of mediators,
[0:24]
Introduction to today's episode
[0:22]but should make the connection. I hope you have stimulating thoughts and enjoy listening. And now the podcast begins.
[0:32]Welcome to the podcast Gut durch die Zeit, the podcast about mediation, conflict coaching and organisational consulting, a podcast by INKOVEMA. I'm Sascha Weigel and I'd like to welcome you to a new episode. Today's episode is about socio-political developments that affect the focus topic of this podcast. Conflicts and dealing with conflicts. There is a common belief among mediators and conflict counsellors that conflicts are not the problem, but how they are dealt with. However, in light of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the upheavals within Germany, epitomised by the electoral successes of the AfD and the BSW, it is not just cherished perspectives and assessments that are shifting. Rather, it seems that the ground is shifting from under our feet. Blessed are those who can still distinguish between their truths and perspectives, which are worth fighting for, and those that need to be questioned in the face of changing circumstances.
[1:35]Mediators and conflict counsellors are affected by these developments,
[1:43]
The challenges facing mediators
[1:38]like many others, are challenged in their practice as well as in their self-image. And there are likely to be stumbling blocks and pitfalls along the way. So it's not the worst idea to consult external perspectives. And why not take to heart what you tell others every day? And that's why today I've invited a historian whose work and research focuses on such fundamental processes of change. Welcome to the podcast, Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk. Hello, hello to you. Perhaps a few words about you to put things in context, also for one or two listeners here in the podcast. How did it come about that you became a historian and are still helping to shape this debate today? I came into conflict with the state I lived in, the GDR, relatively early on, when I was not even really a teenager and then a teenager. The conflicts came upon me without me having changed. They were fuelled by the fact that at 12 I said I wanted to do this and at 14 I said I didn't want to do that anymore.
[3:01]Which is somehow quite age-appropriate at that age, typical, not worth mentioning at all. Except that the state found it very unpleasant. I don't want to go into that in detail now. I've told it often enough, if you're interested.
[3:16]In any case, this developed into a multi-stage and multi-dimensional conflict that I didn't really understand at first. I knew that something was going to happen to me. That's why I struggled with myself for so long about whether I could turn my yes into a yes, because I was also afraid of the reactions of my parents, especially my father. Not afraid of him hitting me or anything like that, not at all, but afraid of his disappointment and fear of the conflict that would then arise. As I said, I didn't really change in principle. I stayed where I was. I just said I didn't want it anymore. I was 14 years old. And then I was treated for a year and a half. Treated is the wrong verb, worked on. They tried to dissuade me again. And in the end, this conflict became an almost unsolvable clash of different cultures, different goals, different life plans that couldn't be resolved. And I was already very intensively involved with history during this time, for a completely different reason, namely that history was in the GDR, where communists were in power, the most important legitimising authority for everything they did.
[4:39]It is supposedly legitimised by history and thus justified by history. And I was interested in whether what they were telling us was actually true. I then started to look into it in detail and realised that it raised many other questions, so to speak, which also had something to do with my personal career and biography.
[5:03]And exactly, and that then of course played a role in my involvement with history, initially as a young guy. I couldn't do my A-levels because of this conflict, which then became unsolvable. I couldn't do my A-levels, so I couldn't go to university, but I had a lot of time as a porter, which I was then, for many years, to deal with such questions.
[5:24]
Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk and his perspective
[5:25]And then came the freedom revolution, the wall was breached and there was also an archive revolution, which meant that the state's previously top-secret archives were opened up and I was there right from the start, I was one of the first to be involved and have actually always been involved, you might say.
[5:47]I was involved in conflict stories, with uprisings, with protests, with opposition, with persecution, not only, but very massively. with that. Well, and because I was a very young guy, 23, when it all started in 1990, and I started writing books very early on and got involved in all kinds of debates and was on many commissions and in many institutions, I'm still there. And if you are somehow persistent enough, then at some point even the last ignoramus will no longer be able to ignore you. Simply because of the fact that you've somehow always been there. And I'm that guy now, I'm not even 60 yet and yet somehow I've always been there. Everyone else around me slowly died out. They no longer exist. Of course, many new people are joining. And I'm the guy who's somehow always been there. That brings new conflicts, by the way. We will certainly come to that. But there's one aspect that I've noticed again.
[6:45]Perhaps I misunderstood him, but she came from a political family, so to speak, in a politicised time where political opinion, even if it was only about this fundamental concept of freedom, was ignited and discussed at the dinner table. And I remember that from my family back in the 90s. And then it got a bit lost for me. And it was a rather apolitical time. But now it's come back in the last few years. Is that something you can confirm from your professional involvement with society and history?
[7:27]So I can't judge how you perceived and felt something, I can't say anything about that either. In general social terms, I would say that what you say is not true.
[7:40]
The influence of dictatorship on politics
[7:41]This is probably really very much characterised by your personal perceptions, your experiences and perhaps also your environment. Well, one thing is that you have to say in general that there is no politics in a dictatorship. Many people always say that. Politics is a public negotiation involving different interests, different approaches, different currents and different objectives. There is no such thing in a dictatorship. That's why the people there are not called politicians, but functionaries.
[8:14]Because they work and they have to implement and enforce certain orders. And everyone has to submit to them. And anyone who does not submit to this pressure, these mechanisms and systems, will not be dealt with politically, but rather legally. Or they will be socially ostracised, they will be marginalised or they will deliberately marginalise themselves, like I did when I said, "Fuck you all, I'm going to be in the Vörtner. I'm 18 years old and I'm going to be a gatekeeper. I think most people can understand that quite well if you look at my Wiki entry, that even at 18 my career aspiration was probably not to work as a doorman for the rest of my life. But I have, so to speak, emerged from the highly ideologised, now comes the counter term to politicisation in the dictatorship.
[9:02]I tried to withdraw from the systemic world as far as I could, which of course never really works one hundred per cent. But if you're young, if you don't have any responsibility, if you're blah blah blah and of course have a bit of a will and say, fuck you all, I don't want to make your careers, then there are opportunities and especially in a late phase of a dictatorship, when it's already weak and can no longer hit everyone over the head, then it works. The goal of my actions, the goal of the actions of my political friends, was to return to politics.
[9:39]Enabling politics means enabling conflicts, being able to resolve conflicts in a social and governmental climate that also has a certain openness, so to speak, i.e. negotiating compromises. That is politics. Not swearing everyone to a consensus, but looking for compromises.
[10:07]
The 90s in a political context
[10:04]And that is also the essence of democracy. And against the background of what I have just indicated, you will probably well understand that I also experienced the 1990s very differently to how you describe them. Namely as a very intense political phase. Domestically, it was about Paragraph 218, it was about questions of reunification, it was about the question of foreign policy, how NATO behaved, how Germany behaved in the Balkan wars, for example, how it behaved in the Iran-Iraq wars, how it behaved over the attacks on Israel. In other words, how it behaved towards the collapse of the Soviet Union, as it did during the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Chechnya issue. I could list a thousand other things. For people who were interested in politics, who were politically active, it was just as intense a time as it is today, but of course a different time.
[11:04]If I may say the last sentence, as a historian I naturally argue differently than a psychoanalyst and say that you have your personal experience, that's okay, so to speak, nobody wants to take it away from you, you can cultivate it and do what you want with it, but you should be careful not to transfer your personal experience into a general socio-political thesis, so to speak. I experienced the 90s in exactly the same way. It was highly political, there was a lot of discussion and a lot was unclear and there was a spirit of optimism. So those were the 90s, so to speak, and I then referred to this sociological observation that the so-called Merkel years tended to be characterised as apolitical, and I wanted to know whether you could confirm this from your perspective. Which then, with 2015, 2016 and the upheavals that began, also changed the public climate here quite noticeably, so to speak.
[12:12]But I can't confirm that. It's something that people like to say. It's something that many people experience. Of course, it also has something to do with the fact that a whole generation grew up thinking that Merkel was synonymous with Chancellor because they somehow didn't know anything about her. So that's clear, there's a lot of life experience behind it. Of course, that also has a bit to do with the fact that Chancellor Angela Merkel had a completely different style of leadership that people didn't know before and didn't know afterwards. Mr Scholz tried to imitate that a little, but then it wasn't quite as convincing. But when I look at this process now as a historian, as a social analyst, as an observer of society or as a theorist, and that is perhaps a bit of a professional dent that I bring with me as a historian.
[13:09]I am not inclined to say that what is happening in 2015 has its origins in 2014, but rather in 1914.
[13:18]
Historical contexts and current developments
[13:18]So I look at large development contexts and when I look at what has happened in the last, let's say, ten years in the USA and in Western Europe, including Germany and including East Germany.
[13:32]Then I can open up completely different levels. I can open up what the difference is to the awakening at the beginning of the 19th century 100 years later. I can identify things that represent a paradigm shift, that have relevant cultural and mental consequences, which then lead to different behaviour. Or I look at what things the 1980s actually achieved that are perhaps only now coming to fruition. And then I look specifically at what it means when car manufacturing collapses in Detroit, what consequences does that have, what consequences does that have when certain US politicians say in the early 1990s that we have to construct the enemy in the public sphere, what does that do to communication, what does that do to the conflict resolution strategy, is that even still possible? So Trump is actually a product of the 80s and 90s. We just didn't realise it. And then I, with my profession, look at East Germany and say, okay, what did an eruptive event like the freedom revolution of 1989, which swept away 80 to 90 per cent of East Germans, actually do?
[14:45]And in the event, they were inactive and did nothing. And then at some point they had to become active. What does that actually do to a society? And then the reunification phase. And that's where we come to the interesting case. Conflicts arise. And how controllable are conflicts? And you can see that some conflicts are no longer manageable at some point, because people and societies can only tolerate change to the extent that they can cope with it. And if it becomes too much, too radical, too fast, then at some point they capitulate, or the particularly negative side, they start looking for someone to blame. And that's an old human pattern, it's nothing new, but now we've been experiencing it quite radically for around 10 or 12 years because of things like this and, of course, there are also current factors in addition to these historical factors,
[15:43]
The digital revolution and its consequences
[15:41]that are catalysing this. And for me, the most important thing that we can currently observe worldwide is the impact of the digital revolution, which we cannot anticipate but which we accept.
[15:53]Above all, the initial consequence is that we no longer have any ideas about the future, no longer pursue a policy for the future, no longer discuss politics, but in fact only manage in the opposite direction. And that leads to extreme fears and fears of loss. And they are therefore much more pronounced in the western world than elsewhere, because only where you have a lot can you also interrogate a lot. I would like to come back to this aspect. But first of all, you alluded to your thesis that East Germany is such a laboratory for seeing developments through a magnifying glass.
[16:31]If a society, as I understand it now, is put through the wash too quickly, too violently, so to speak, and then tries to orientate itself somehow, even if it's just to find someone to blame first. And I would be interested to hear your view on this. The narrative is that communication guided by reason can lead to conflicts being resolved differently than through violence and war, and in the 1980s the peace movement, West Germany in particular, was taken into consideration. One starting point for this mediation movement was that conflicts could be discussed at the negotiating table with the help of neutral, impartial mediators and that there was an idea of progress through communication that could historicise war. That used to be the case in the past and today it is completely out of sync. How do you view these developments? Was there ever anything to it at all, or was it simply a blind spot and people were simply mistaken when it came to communicative progress in dealing with conflicts? Our world has never been as good as it is today.
[17:50]No matter what factors you look at, if you take a longer period of time, let's take 100 years, you can take 500 years, then it will be even more impressive, but take 100 years. We will notice a global improvement in the world everywhere that we have not communicated, that is not in the news and that we have not even realised. Never before have so few children starved to death as in the present day. There have never been so many people who are not illiterate. Gender inequality has declined massively worldwide. And no matter what I list, you would have to add a but to everything and say, but it's all still pretty weird and very unjust. And now let's move on.
[18:37]There have also never been so few people killed by natural disasters as in the last few decades. Although we have had these major disasters in the Pacific Ocean with tsunamis and so on and so forth. They used to be on a completely different scale. This has something to do with the fact that humans can obviously learn to deal with nature. We know that all of this is actually a catastrophe, climate catastrophe and so on and so forth. Straightening of river beds and so on and so forth and so on. And now perhaps… the most dramatic or surprising aspect is that never before have so few people lost their lives in armed conflicts as at present. Although our present is dominated by wars to an extent that we would not have thought possible 30 years ago. This view, 70s, 80s, that we can solve or at least contain conflicts not just within the family or between friends or at work, but globally through communication strategies, that we can control them so that they don't break out. This has always been an extremely Eurocentric, white perspective that has nothing whatsoever to do with reality.
[19:58]The racism that subjugated half the world, so to speak, was alive and well in the 1980s. The wars all over the world didn't stop and Europe only seemed so pacified because this nuclear arms race and this eyeball-to-eyeball approach to death existed, and somehow everyone was afraid of this last step, thank God. But you'll notice that I'm very sceptical as to whether things were really so much better in the 1980s than we might think today. It was different, there's always no question about that, because everything is always somehow different. Even scepticism is a very optimistic view. Would you say that Europe is now taking the step out of the European door into the world in the same way that the citizens of the GDR suddenly found themselves in a capitalist world after 1990, which became a bit problematic because I find it very positive, but it generally has negative connotations, where they suddenly had to take personal responsibility because they had it. Thank you very much. And the framework conditions that had previously obscured their view have been removed.
[21:17]I fear that if it had gone Europe's way, Europe would still be bobbing along in a very provincial way. There is this famous book by Chakrabarty, Deprovincialising Europe. So it's actually about globalising Europe. And Europe has been forced to do this. Not because it wanted to. Europe used to be the emperor, so to speak, who tried to subjugate the world.
[21:47]And at some point a few decades ago, the world stopped allowing itself to be subjugated and instead revolted for various historical reasons. Paul Kennedy, a famous American historian who has just turned 80, also wrote about the expansion thesis, i.e. that empires of a certain size are practically doomed to fail and so on and so forth. But of course there were also many other reasons. In any case, the European empires collapsed and the colonised societies freed themselves and went their own ways, still very dependent for the first few decades. And that has changed in the course of the new form of globalisation, globalisation has always existed, but now there is a new form and a more radical form and a form from which no one can escape, there is a different networking of the world, so to speak. And if you look at certain regions of the world now, it looks more like Europe has to make an effort.
[22:47]To be able to keep up at all if you somehow look towards China, towards India, but also towards Brazil and so on and so forth. So there is a huge shake-up there. And in this respect, I wouldn't say that Europe has taken the step out, but that the world has come to Europe, whether Europe wanted to or not. And Europe, if we want to survive as an idea, perhaps even as a political and economic entity at some point - it doesn't look too good, after all - and also as a military entity, then we have to use these impulses as a basis for the future.
[23:23]
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine
[23:21]as Europe and globalise ourselves. Or it seems to me that now is a good time to take this perspective and look at what we are currently facing in Europe, namely the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and what that has to do with us.
[23:40]And tailored to the topic or the framework of this podcast, the question is, can a country that is not formally involved, but at least in my opinion is involved, take a neutral position there at all? How is it to be assessed that the Baltic shadow fleet, the attacks on German soil, the poisonings and killings, all of this, which is not only formally a war against Ukraine, so to speak, but against the Western European model? Is this a development that is exactly what you mean, that the world is coming back to Europe, to Western Europe in this way? With power politics, with force and we have to take a stand. That's something else now.
[24:36]So it's not a conflict for now. I am also very grateful to you for not using the word in this context. That's another point that I wanted to discuss with you anyway. People completely fail to recognise that there is an attacker and a defender here. And one party is waging war and the other is doing what it has to do to survive. Thank you very much.
[24:58]That's exactly how it is. Some attack with the aim of destroying others. You have to call it by its name. It is an attempt to destroy Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian elites and Ukrainian history. This is what former KGB Major President Vladimir Putin said from the very beginning, what he explicitly formulated on the eve of the expansion of the campaign of annihilation against Ukraine to the entire territory of the state on 24 February 2022. And a few days ago, we are now talking about the end of June, he reiterated this in St. Petersburg a few days ago with these exact words: wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is Russia, there will be no more leaving, Ukraine belongs to Russia and Ukraine no longer exists. He said that word for word.
[25:59]
The conflict between aggressor and defender
[25:57]So these are his war aims. And mediators can't mediate anything, absolutely nothing, because the only thing that helps against this war aim is to fight back by any means necessary. The question is up to what level you defend yourself.
[26:20]You try to use all means, and all means are not just military means and partisan means, but also diplomatic means. That is part of every war from the very beginning. That's why this stupid talk from some Kremlin mouthpieces who are all over the place here in Germany, who are always calling for diplomacy to be used, cannot be surpassed in terms of stupidity and demagoguery, because every war is always accompanied by diplomacy. There has never been a war that has not been accompanied and waged by diplomatic means. And that is of course also the case now. But the crucial question now is, firstly, what is the goal of the attacked state and the attacked society, i.e. Ukraine?
[27:09]Is it enough for them to simply kick the Russians, the Russian Federation and the Russian troops back out to the state borders?
[27:20]Or do we actually have to do what the Allies did to Germany, destroy the centre in order to guarantee peace? I have no opinion on that. Of course, I can prove historically that Russia has never been defeated within its own borders. Russia has lost many, many wars, contrary to what many claim. Russia has lost most of its wars, but it has never been defeated on its territory, practically in Moscow or in St Petersburg. There are logistical reasons for this, there are topographical reasons for this and many other things. I don't know that either. I'm not a military expert either. What matters now is that Ukraine is not destroyed, not annihilated. We all know, at least everyone who wants to know, what is happening in the occupied, occupied territories. Russian infiltration, the destruction of all Ukrainian life, many, many mass crimes and so on and so forth. And the second question related to this is the one that probably interests you even more, I have the impression. What role do we play in this? To what extent is this our war? Yes, or even orientated, why, maybe it's only related to East Germany, I can't say for sure, but why are we ignoring it so much?
[28:45]Why are we on the one side, there are those who say, I've never been afraid of Russia, I don't know what it's all about, they're just defending themselves. And the others say that we shouldn't go to war with Russia, they are simply invincible and we should be sensible and keep our feet still and let them do what they want with the Ukrainians.
[29:05]That is actually the question, why is this being ignored? Well, and that's why the question is, so to speak, what does it have to do with us? And there are different legitimate answers to that. Of course, someone can say that it has nothing to do with me. It doesn't interest me either. I'm not afraid of Russia either. West Germans, for example, and I'm saying this now because you just said East Germany, no, a Stegner, a Mützenich, a Richard David Precht, an Alice Schwarzer and all those other birds by any other name, they're all West Germans. And like East Germans, like Gysi, like Wagenknecht, like all these other birds, they talk all this rubbish. Because in my opinion, and this is the other legitimate answer, they either ignore the basic conflict at stake, they haven't understood it or, because they are Kremlin loudspeakers, they don't want to hear it anyway. So Wagenknecht, other people are just Kremlin loudspeakers. They have a completely different intention. But of course that's not the case for everyone who, let's say, spreads narratives that are a bit reminiscent of the Kremlin. You just can't assume that everyone is a Kremlin supporter, so to speak, not at all.
[30:23]Many also ignore this because they think it's none of our business or because they are afraid of Russia. And fear is the thing that is articulated the least in such debates, even though most people have it. And for me, the most legitimate response to this is to say that I want us to stay out of it. And if you then say, because I'm scared, I'm scared for my life, I'm scared for my country, I'm scared for my children, I'm scared for my parents, I'm scared in other ways. I think that's absolutely legitimate. It's also very rational. You can't discuss it any further, but you can just leave it at that. And you're right, little is done. There are few voices that conclude that I don't want it that way because I'm afraid for my children or something like that.
[31:10]There is also a good reason for this, because the public generally consists of people who hold political office or who are considered intellectuals, who are regarded as interpreters and interpreters and whatever else. And if they stand up in public and say, I'm afraid, then a large part of the public will certify that they are incapable of conflict, so to speak. They will be told that they are incapable of abstracting from themselves, so to speak, that they are weak and all that sort of thing. And that's why they avoid it. And I am someone who says that if I know someone's intentions, why someone says this and that in public, then they are a much more interesting discussion partner for me, even if I completely disagree with them, than if someone hides behind some bogus arguments, so to speak. I come from a different school of thought, I come from a different realm of experience.
[32:07]For me, even in 1991, Russia was an empire that somehow gave reason to think of it as peaceful. And certainly not at the end of the 90s. There were those terrible Chechen wars.
[32:24]We have always seen how Russia has dealt with renegades. Brutal to the last. There was never any reason to trust Putin. I am someone who has spent decades dealing with secret police forces. I know pretty well what secret police training means and if you remain loyal to it. And Putin has always remained loyal. What it does to you, what prerequisites you have to fulfil. And how you will be bound to this mafia-like alliance for life, so to speak. And it's not for nothing that Putin has been surrounded by secret services and secret police people throughout his rise, because it's a completely different kind of alliance experience that he's forging. And in this respect, I have always had a different perspective than the majority, but of course it was also very strongly influenced by my experiences of lack of freedom in the
[33:18]
The defence of Western liberalism
[33:15]Communism, which I only share with a minority. Most of them, even though they lived there, didn't have the experience that they lacked freedom or that they were oppressed, but they just put up with it, as they somehow accept all sorts of things, and in this respect, against the background that I have no illusions about the actual goals of Russian imperial policy, it's about defence.
[33:44]Western liberalism. Russia did not invade Ukraine because it felt threatened. If they had felt threatened, then after Sweden and Finland joined NATO during the war against Ukraine, they would have kept their troops on the border, which has now been extended by 1,300 kilometres.
[34:06]Reinforced because they are afraid of NATO. But they didn't reinforce it, they withdrew all the troops from there and moved them to Ukraine. They are not afraid of NATO because they know that NATO is not an offensive alliance, only in their propaganda, but a defence alliance. It's about Russia's and the Kremlin Origashi's fear of the spread of the freedom bacillus, of Western liberalism, which is becoming more and more widespread in Ukraine. And that's what it was all about. And that's why, if you know a bit about the philosophical, political and ideological background to the whole thing that Putin is playing around with his claque, then you know that their big dream is a Eurasian empire from Vladivostok to Lisbon.
[34:52]And that is why the attack on Ukraine is essentially an attack on the free Western world. And that is why I am saying this so clearly, which will perhaps shock many people. Some will think that he's out of his mind. The Third World War has long since begun. It's just that it's no longer going the way we know it from the documentaries about the Second World War. Or as we might remember it from the Vietnam War or the war in Afghanistan. The Third World War is above all a hybrid war. And it began a long time ago and is being waged against the West at all levels. It is not only being waged by cutting the submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, but also with non-stop attacks against the West's infrastructure. And they are far worse than most people even want to imagine. I remain silent because I can. It's not easy to pick up a good thread, because I have to let that settle first.
[35:47]What does that mean for us in concrete terms, if not the two issues that you have touched on and explained? On the one hand, this current situation of attack on our way of life and what you mentioned earlier, the opening of Europe's windows. We are in a new situation as a united, but not yet fully unified Europe. What does that mean for us? How do we get out of this mixed situation or how do we get through it well? Also in view of the electoral successes, the political upheavals, I'll call them casually now, which are the result of a society that is perhaps overburdened by its perpetrators. Well, I have one big advantage, that's the only advantage I have when I act in public and I do that all the time. I don't want to be loved, nor do I want to be elected. That means I can speak as my analytical mind and my empirical work dictate.
[37:01]I would say now, but hopefully you want to be heard. Everyone who speaks in public, who publishes, wants to be heard. And of course I do too, that's why I write books, that's why I'm on some other podcast or whatever every third day. Or in interviews in newspapers and radio stations, of course. But I said something else. And two things follow from that. One is that most people who have grown up in Western liberalism lack, thank God, a fundamental experience that many people in the East - not just in East Germany, but in the Eastern Bloc in Europe - were able to gather. But even there, where right-wing dictatorships, fascist dictatorships ruled until, I don't know, the mid-1970s, if you think of Greece, Spain and Portugal. And I haven't finished there yet.
[38:00]Everything that surrounds us is man-made. But most people in the West behave as if it were made by God. And God-made would mean that it is imperishable. Everything that is man-made can be destroyed, can perish, can change so much that it is no longer recognisable. And that is exactly what I observe, namely a great distance to freedom. For me, freedom is the most important thing there is. And I see a great betrayal of freedom. And freedom can only be betrayed in freedom.
[38:38]Inside, you are close to freedom. Too far inside for you to recognise it as a destructible good.
[38:46]Well, and without freedom there is no peace. Without freedom, there is peace in the graveyard, whatever. The GDR, for example, was not only an extremely unliberal state, it was also extremely unpeaceful. Contrary to what its apologists claim today. Anyone who has to build a wall to prevent people from leaving and shoots anyone who wants to cross over is simply unpeaceful. And anyone who pretends that you're only allowed to have one opinion and for everything else you get an F at school, so to speak, or don't get a place at university or are expelled somewhere, is extremely unpeaceful.
[39:22]In this respect, conflicts, unlike wars, can ultimately only be resolved with a minimum, or not a minimum, but a degree of basic liberal conditions. Otherwise it is always a forced solution. It's different with wars, by the way. They are usually resolved at the expense of one party, so to speak. There is no longer any talk of freedom or anything else, but one party is the loser. And even in a diplomatic solution, one side will have to accept greater losses than the other. But the second thing that follows from this, I'll be very brief. I am not optimistic. I am observing a world, a Western world,
[40:14]
The threat of authoritarian tendencies
[40:07]in Europe, so to speak, in the USA, which gives me more cause for concern than hope. And I believe that we are currently on the threshold of an authoritarian era.
[40:20]Here in Europe, here in Germany. In the USA, we can see how an authoritarian, I would go even further and say a fascist regime is being established in real time. We don't know how long it will last, but it doesn't look good at the moment and we can see how quickly things are being destroyed there, how quickly new mechanisms are taking effect. It's unbelievable that most of us wouldn't have thought that possible, which we can't see. And that is the most important resource of democracy and freedom, how trust is destroyed. And that is also something that, as a conflict researcher and mediator, you will know better than I do, trust cannot be destroyed in a minute, but sometimes it cannot be rebuilt for decades. And that is what should worry us all about what is happening around us right now.
[41:19]And democracy thrives on trust. Trust is a resource, an advance on what is to come. And that is currently being destroyed on a massive scale in the USA, because if we look closely, everywhere in the western world. I would actually categorise the processes and approaches in a larger time frame. This started a long time ago and was also revealed with frivolity for a long time.
[41:54]But I also like to keep this other America that is often invoked today alive, so to speak, and I believe it still exists. I'll come back to this or try to come back to this, how we can navigate our way through it. And it's always, I know it's always daft when you're used as a historian to make predictions. But you started by looking at the authoritarian era. Would you say that we have a good chance of averting this together? And I'm simply implying that there are chances. But I want to know whether they are good. Of course there are opportunities, there's no question about that. And I'm a historian, I mean, I'm not a futurologist. As a rule, historians, including myself, are boring, conservative types who became historians because they are not particularly creative. We deal with things that have fallen over. You can then somehow reconstruct why it fell over or why something fell over. But that's where it ends.
[43:08]But that's also why it's somehow so exciting for many people, because everyone can have a say. Everyone can have a say. I don't think you, as historians, are the only ones who have to deal with that.
[43:20]Yes, I'm ironising that a bit. But that's the way it is. It's not like that either. Theologians, who also argue a lot historically, are actually concerned with the future. But historians are not really concerned with the future. I'm perhaps a bit of an exception in that I'm also very much involved in current affairs. And when you get involved on a daily basis, you're actually concerned with the future.
[43:47]Of course, we have every opportunity to prevent this, but when I stick my head out of the window, I marvel at how many people continue to party on the Titanic. And don't want to recognise all this or don't realise it or don't get involved. Freedom only works and democracy only works through commitment. Freedom and democracy means getting involved in your own affairs. And that is socio-political involvement by getting involved, contributing, criticising, changing, insisting on change, challenging the state, challenging, criticising parliaments, but at the same time working together. Well, and let's stay in Germany for a moment, we are seeing an ominous trend towards reducing all of this. We have a party democracy and hardly anyone is organised in a party anymore. That's a huge problem. And in East Germany, the level of organisation in parties is ten times lower than in West Germany. And it has already fallen dramatically there.
[44:57]So when it comes to this potential from which you could draw optimism, then on the one hand you can say on an idealistic level, yes, we all have to get moving somehow and do something, but on the other hand there are also structural requirements. And that includes party memberships, that includes association work, that includes everything that makes up civil society. And we can see that all of this is on the decline. Even the churches, which used to be important pillars of civil society, are all suffering from a loss of members and so on. I don't know, last year, I was anything but a friend of the Catholic Church, for political reasons, for the reasons, of course, of all these crimes that have been committed against children and wards over decades and centuries.
[45:44]But I don't think there were even a dozen priestly pastorals in the Catholic Church last year. You have to imagine that in Germany. And that's been going on for years, so they're happy if they have 23 a year or so. So it's all shrinking and that's changing society in a massive way. And I don't think we've yet found a way as a society to deal with it in a different way, how we can save ourselves from ourselves. Take a look at the current scandal and parliamentary group leader Spahn. Society is more or less watching as someone is smilingly protected by the grandees of his party, including the President of the Bundestag, even though the injustice is so obvious and apparent. Yes, so and…
[46:37]It's not about Spahn, I don't give a shit about him, to be honest. But I do care about the signals it sends out to society. You ask where we get our strength or our optimism from,
[46:51]
Commitment to freedom and democracy
[46:50]that we can avert all of this. And I can only say that I am somewhere every day, fighting for freedom and democracy, writing, talking, discussing, in the hope of doing my small part to avert the worst. And in the hope of inspiring others to perhaps get more involved than before. That is the only hope I have. And that's why I'm happy to invite you here to the podcast and take the risk of making good on my earlier announcement and addressing the topic, which now seems quite appropriate to me. Because the groups that have grown in recent years, while all other groups, associations and parties, trade unions etc. have declined, are the digital groups. The digital groups are the ones that have declined. And opinion-forming via digital media, which then feeds back into non-digital opinion-forming in politics and elections. And that was you earlier, if I remember correctly.
[47:58]The biggest influencing factor and biggest problem that we currently have to shoulder socially is this radically rapid, comprehensive digitalisation. Whereby we in Germany, if you believe the narrative at least, are not at the front of the pack, but rather at the end of the pelleton to see whether they fall in front and we can still get out of the way or whether we simply have to ride into the mass crash as cyclists.
[48:32]Do you see the connection between the loss of traditional civil society ties and the emergence of digital communities and opinion-forming in recent decades? You have also been very active in recent years, at least in the digital sphere, and have gained a lot of experience there. So what you're referring to now, the whole social media sector in the broader sense, including all the new media, with the loss of importance of traditional media, print and analogue broadcasting stations, that's just one aspect of it. This area has massively changed our communication behaviour. And it has massively changed our political perception, especially among those who are active on social media. There are many of them, but by no means all of them.
[49:34]This bubble culture also leads to a kind of blindness. So if you had spent the last few months exclusively on social media about the armed conflicts in Israel, against Israel, against Gaza, against Iran, you would get a completely different picture of how society, German society, is ticking than if you look at it from the perspective of society as a whole. It's a completely different picture, so to speak, in the social media there are almost only pros and cons, whereas the wider society takes a much more differentiated view and also has a much more differentiated assessment. At least if you can trust the opinion polls from the last few weeks. And I still do, even if I'm very sceptical about it. Incidentally, this is for the reason that has to do with social media, because a large proportion of the demoscopic survey is still carried out via landline numbers, which is completely absurd because hardly anyone still has landline numbers and uses them, and if they do, it's usually older people, who are often very old, and with mobile phones, with mobile numbers, you can always ask who's calling.
[50:45]Calling a phone number he doesn't know. This is also a very special milieu. The demoscopic institutes are of course aware of this, as are the sociologists, but they are still fighting a tough defence. We're talking about an industry worth billions and they haven't really found a way to get out of this malaise. And anyone who criticises this, and I have criticised it publicly on several occasions, is immediately confronted with the full force of the supporters of these traditional, demoscopic surveys and with sociologists and so on and so forth. And I can only shake my head and say, well, that's what you do. But we are actually talking about much more than that, even though I spoke earlier about uncertainty and what global digitalisation means, and above all recently about what is associated with the keyword AI, artificial intelligence. This is because, at least in terms of self-perception, they also pose a very real threat to large sections of society. When the question is, will my job still exist tomorrow? Will I be talking to him or the AI tomorrow?
[51:49]Or vice versa, so to speak. I mean, I now know restaurants in Berlin where my ice-cream sundae is brought to me by a computer that arrives. It's all still a bit awkward because it's still being loaded by people, but it's all just a matter of weeks or months that things have changed. And no matter which area of society you come from, every job, almost every job, is at risk. Even a large proportion of the jobs that historians do, for example, are conceivably going to change completely one day. Not what I do, by the way, i.e. not this talking, but the way I write books. You still have to come up with a few ideas, so to speak, on how to tap into untapped sources in such a meaningful way that you can then turn them into books. That will probably happen, but most likely not during my career or lifetime. And so there are a few other jobs where you can still say with relative certainty that they will still exist. But there are so few of them.
[52:51]So most legal jobs, sooner or later they will be done by AI, many medical jobs. So I'm really talking about the highly qualified, we're not talking about sales jobs or repairing cars or trams or anything else. And that of course creates extreme uncertainty. And now the question is, what can we do about it? And we as a society have never really found an answer to this until now.
[53:19]
The longing for simple harmony
[53:15]We try to sort it out or something, but the extremists have an answer. And that's why this makes me so uneasy and why I believe that we have little power right now to avert the catastrophe, because the extremists, usually right-wing extremists, usually fascists, whether it's just AfD or Trump or whoever.
[53:37]They say they have two things in their hands and they're getting caught. The first is that we know who is to blame. They are usually foreigners, refugees, newcomers. And they just talk and they say Jews, of course. And they say that we used to have such an ethnic homogeneity, and we want to go back to that. And that's the second point, that they say they promise a bright future by evoking the past and saying we'll bring the past into the future. That's the basic promise of all these guys. And of course it catches on because they are very simple answers and most people and society as such love simple answers. And the longing, the longing is addressed.
[54:24]You are prepared to make an effort to work towards this future and a lot is taken on, so it's that simple, but it is a strong longing that is addressed. Of course, and that's understandable. And that's probably where we come to your core topic. Conflicts and mediations and so on are always essentially about restoring harmony. Well, however you define it, so to speak, but in any case peace, at least on a small scale. And we promise you that. We promise you peace, we promise you your well-tended front garden. We promise you, so to speak, that you can do your thing as you please and that all the excitement around you will subside. And if you ask yourself, no matter who you are, you will realise that there is a part of everyone, most people, that is precisely this calm, this harmony, this…
[55:27]And simple in Peace live want, available is. And I mine, we are Yes everything People, the many Shares in itself have. The Rebels, the Punk, the Wiederborstchen, the Participants, the Suppressor, the Criminal or Criminals and even also this Harmony system. And in this respect, the Question is Yes believe I always only like this, which Shares are more dominant, which Shares are stronger, which has one better, which has one less in the Handle. And in this respect but now on the Society transferred.
[55:57]See I even, that many these Desire to Silence, these Desire supposed Silence, these Desire to supposed Harmony have and with pleasure ready are, in favour other to suppress and other to switch off in the truest Senses of the word, whether now about Wars or even by Minorities expressed become. So it goes actually therefore, and the is a Picture from the 19. Century, one Dictatorship the Majority to erect. And the Dictatorship the Majority is even exactly the classic Counterexample to one parliamentary Democracy, in the the Minority rights to the Validity come and in the the also so to speak negotiated become as equal Interests. And the Dictatorship the Majority wants the not, but the wants so to speak their Peace and quiet on Costs the others. And therefore have we these funny whole Culture wars, whether it only at the Gender star goes or whether it at the Rain fountain flags or what also always goes. The is so to speak, behind it stands the Longing to the Dictatorship the Majority.
[57:00]
Conclusion and outlook for the future
[57:00]Sorry. For nothing, everything good. Mr Kowalczuk, I thank you me for this extensive, instructive Conversation to Topics, the not so simple to grab are, comprehensible made were from You and like the it also us as Mediators applies, here categorise and also then in whole practical Activities to transfer, what Certainly Time needs. And whether we the have, stands in Question. I Thank you You and wish You everything Good. I Thank you You also. Until soon, yes. Bye bye. Ilko Sascha Kowalczuk, Historian.
[57:41]Connoisseur the GDR history and post-communist History, Fighter and Fighter for the Freedom. I was today here in the Podcast and we have whole large Lines outlined Yes. The but also for ours everyday Labour Meaning have can, Meaning have and Meaning perhaps have could. When we them in the View take and look, what do we actually, when we Conflicts edit, the we perceive can, steady more perceive can. And clear is me become in the Conversation, that it for the Assessment really one Question the Perspective is and sometimes also the historical Dimensions, to which Judgement or to which Assessment we come, which Theses we form, the then also ours concrete Interventions in acute Conflict counselling and Mediations then performed become. A Podcast, the think about it, stimulate shall, thoughtful make shall and whether the successful is, decide you and her. And gives please Feedback, what you through the Head goes, what you stimulated or also excited has, so that we in addition ins Conversation come.
[59:09]I thank you me with you and you all, that her here in the Podcast again with thereby was. I wish you one good Summertime and remain with best Wishes. Yours Sascha Weigel, Host from INKOVEMA in the Institute for Conflict and Negotiation management in Leipzig and Partner for professional Mediation and Coaching training programmes.
[59:32]
Leave A Comment